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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The Bloodless Revolution: The
Role of the Fifth Circuit in the
Integration of the Deep South
Frank T. Read*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 1, 1981, the nation's foremost civil rights tribunal will be
no more. On that date, the Fifth Circuit Reorganization Act will become
effective and the famous United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit will be divided into two new circuits.' With the passing of the
Fifth Circuit into history's dusty pages, it is appropriate to reflect on the
contributions of that court in this nation's monumental struggle to desegregate the public schools of the Deep South.
On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court, in its most important decision in this century, rejected the "separate but equal" doctrine
of Plessy v. Ferguson,' which had been the law since 1896. The Court
unanimously held that the segregation of white and Negro children in a
state's public schools solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws
* Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law -

Indianapolis. The

information in this tribute article was obtained largely from research during the preparation
of a book co-authored by this writer. See, F. READ AND L. McGOuGH, LEr THEM BE JUDGED:
THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH (1978).
1. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94
Stat. 1994 (1980), divides the current United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
into two new circuits. The Fifth (composed of Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas and the Canal
Zone and which will consist of 14 judges) and the Eleventh (composed of Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia and which will consist of 12 judges).
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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permitting or requiring such segregation, denied to Negro children the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
With that decision, the Warren Court gained immortality and the nation
began its only Bloodless Revolution. It is my view that since the Civil
War the most important single event in the internal history of the nation
has been the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.3 At no other time
in recorded history, certainly in the history of this nation, have changes of
such magnitude in attitudes, societal structure, and law occurred so rapidly without the accompaniment of bloody revolution from within or military force from without. We have had a social revolution since 1954, and
that revolution may not yet have run its course. The distinguishing feature of this revolution, rendering it sui generis, is that with few notable
exceptions it was accomplished peacefully, highlighted by a majority of
the white citizens of the South obeying, even though reluctantly, judicial
mandates with which they deeply disagreed.
At the very vortex of this modern revolution in race relations was the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Of all the federal
appeals courts faced with the problem of implementing United States Supreme Court directives, none have had to fight integration battles more
continuously or under more trying circumstances than has the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court faced a task
unique in the annals of the federal judiciary-indeed, a task unique in
the political, social and legal history of the nation. Under only the most
general Supreme Court directives, the Fifth Circuit day after day hammered away at the realities of achieving integration in a hostile local environment, frequently having to assume the heavy burden of administrative
detail connected with seeing that the orders they issued were carried out.
The Fifth Circuit led the way in the doctrinal development of all of the
major civil rights issues: jury selection, 4 public accommodations,' voting
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (hereafter referred to as Brown 1).
4. See Carter v. Green County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587 (1935); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879); Winters v. Cook, 466 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd en banc, 489 F.2d 174 (5th
Cir. 1973); Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1966); Davis v. Davis, 361 F.2d 770
(5th Cir. 1966); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966); Rabinowitz v. United States,
366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966); Scott v. Walker, 358 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1966); Whitus v.
Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53
(5th Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Goldaby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1959); See
also, H. KALVEN & H. ZEis.L, The American Jury (1966); Finkelstein, The Application of
Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury DiscriminationCases, 80 HAtv. L. REv. 338 (1966);
Gewin, Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968: Implementation in the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, 20 MERCER L. REv. 349 (1969); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination:The Next Phase, 41
S. CAL. L. REv. 235 (1968); Note, Jury Discriminationin the South: A Remedy?, 8 COL. J.
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rights' and school desegregation. But it was in school desegregation that
OF LAW AND Soc. PROBLEMS, 589 (1972); Note, The Congress, The Court and Jury Selection:
A Critique of Titles I and II of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1966);
Hearings on S. 3296 before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
5. See, e.g., the following sources concerning the "Jackson Movement," a concerted civil
rights campaign to desegregate the public accommodations of Jackson, Mississippi: Thomas
v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965); Guyot v. Pierce, 372 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1967); Strother v.
Thompson, 372 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1967); Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965);
NAACP v. Thompson, appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 321 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.
1963), 11 Race Rel. L. Rep. 657 (S.D. Miss. 1964), rev'd and remanded, 357 F.2d 831 (5th
Cir. 1966); Palmer v. Thompson, 12 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1467 (S.D. Miss. 1965), aff'd, 391 F.2d
324 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd en banc, 419 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'd, 403 U.S. 217 (1971);
Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 91 (1963); United States v. City of Jackson, 206 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.
Miss. 1962), rev'd and remanded, 318 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1963); Bailey v. Patterson, 199 F.
Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1961), vacated and remanded, 369 U.S. 31 (1962), on remand, 206 F.
Supp. 67 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963); Farmer
v. State, 253 Miss. 289, 161 So. 2d 159 (1964); Thomas v. State, 160 So. 2d 657 (Miss. 1964).
Also helpful as background information about the Jackson Movement were: R. SARRAT, THE
ORDEAL OF SEGREGATION (1966); Comment, Palmer v. Thompson: Everybody Out of the
Pool!, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1972); Sitton, Inquiry into the Mississippi Mind, N.Y. Times
Magazine, Apr. 28, 1963; and contemporary news accounts such as, Washington Post, June
6, 1963, at 15; Jackson Daily News, June 19, 1963, at 4, 15, and July 7, 1961; Delta-Democrat
Times (Greenville, Miss.), Mar. 30, 1961, and Mar. 15, 1964, at 22; and New Orleans TimesPicayune, May 27, 1961.
6. See Howard v. Adams County Bd. of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972), aff'd on rehearing,480 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1973); Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 467 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd en banc, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973); Bell
v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967); Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759
(5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Ramsey, 331 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964); Alabama v. United
States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962); Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Lynd, 301 F,2d 818 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 893 (1962); Toney v.
White, 348 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. La. 1972), afld in part, rev'd in part, 476 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.
1973), modified and aff'd en banc, 488 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Post, 297
F. Supp. 46 (W.D. La. 1969); Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968); United States
V. Campbell, No. GC 633 (N.D. Miss. 1965); Bush v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex.
1963) (three-judge court), aft'd, 376 U.S. 222 (1964); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.
Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158
(N.D. Ga. 1962) (three-judge court), modified, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Toombs v. Fortson, 205
F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam, 384 U.S. 210 (1966);
Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (three-judge court), rev'd sub nom.,
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); United States v. Penton, 212 F. Supp. 193 (M.D.
Ala. 1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958); Reddix v. Lucky, 148
F. Supp. 108 (W.D. La. 1967), rev'd, 252 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1958). See also, C. HAMILTON,
THE BENCH AND BALLOT. SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND BLACK VOTERS
DERNBURG & W.

McFEELY, THE BLACK MAN IN THE LAND OF EQUALITY

NEGRO AND THE BALLOT IN THE SOUTH

UNITED STATEs-CIvIL RIGHTS

(1959); B.

(1970); D.

SCHWARTZ,

2

(1973); I.

(1969); M.

LAN-

PRICE, THE

STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE

STRONG, REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IN ALABAMA
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the problems were the most difficult and the opposition the most
persistent.
From 1954 until the mid-seventies, the problem of school integration
remained largely a Southern problem. A Southern federal appeals court,
composed almost exclusively of Southerners, was left to face the challenge
of translating Supreme Court mandates into reality. With no fanfare, and
with almost no scrutiny by scholars, the Fifth Circuit evolved almost all
modern desegregation doctrine and, in the process, the South became and
remains the nation's most integrated region. Most Americans equate the
Warren Court with school integration and, indeed, that Court supplied
the challenge in Brown I, the first Brown decision, and the mandate in
Brown II,' the 1955 implementation decision. But, the workers in the
vineyard were scores of unrecognized Southern federal district court
judges, of varying abilities and levels of commitment to integration,
whose efforts were scrutinized by a handful of federal appellate judges
sitting in New Orleans. Through the process of everyday combat in federal courtrooms throughout the Deep South, the Fifth Circuit emerged as
the nation's premier civil rights tribunal. In the history of our nation, no
group of men have had a more important impact on the translation of
constitutional guarantees into reality than have those on the Fifth Circuit
who have worn the black robes since 1954.
There are many ways to evaluate the performance of judges: one can
examine
...reversal rates by a higher court, volume of cases docketed and
processed to final judgment, style of opinion writing, repute of colleagues, adherence to precedent, contributions to the development of
decisional law, ability to negotiate an attitude of compromise among litigants, community leadership and minimization of state-federal tensions.
By all of those standards, the twenty year odyssey of the Fifth Circuit
since Brown has been remarkable. However, by one overriding bench
mark the Fifth Circuit has excelled beyond any reasonable expectation:
adherence to constitutional duty in the face of a hostile local
environment.8
There have been so many important cases, so many key judges and so
(1956); B. TAPER, Gom .ION VERsus LIGHTFOOT (1962); P. WATTERS & R. CLEGHORN, CLIMLegal Disenfranchisement of the Negro, 26 J. OF
NEGRO ED. 241 (1957); Tuttle, Equality and the Vote, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 245 (1966); Woodward, The Political Legacy of Reconstruction, 26 J. OF NEGRO ED. 231 (1957); Comment,
Voting Rights: A Case Study of Madison Parish,Louisiana, 38 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 726
(1971); Political Participation,U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights (1968).
7. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)(hereinafter cited as Brown II).
ING JACOB's LADDER (1967); Franklin,

8. F. READ AND L. McGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE
DEEP SOUTH xii (1978)(hereinafter cited as READ AND McGoUGH).
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much human drama that in such a short tribute it is difficult to know
where to begin, what to mention and what to omit. This article will,
therefore, attempt only to highlight the four major desegregation periods
by mentioning, ever so fleetingly, a few of the critical cases and a few of
the key judges. While such treatment is both arbitrary and wholly inadequate, it is hoped the reader will nevertheless be stimulated to learn more
about one of the most important and yet under-publicized periods of the
American judiciary.
II. THE

GATHERING STORM:

1955-1963

On May 17, 1954, "Black Monday" to segregationists, the Deep South
was an apartheid society. All public schools were segregated; all public
accomodations were segregated; only a minute percentage of the voters
were black; and black public office holders were virtually nonexistent.
Black families had less than one-third the median income of white families, and in every respect American blacks were second class citizens in
their own homeland. Furthermore, they were deliberately locked in that
status by a myriad of state imposed Jim Crow laws designed deliberately
to perpetuate the separation of races.' Then came Brown. Brown evoked
an intense, immediate reaction among white southerners and America's
black population, with the rest of the nation looking on from the sidelines
more concerned about other matters. America was emerging from the aftermath of what President Truman referred to as "the police action" in
Korea, the Army-McCarthy hearings were mesmerizing Washington, and
the disasterous French experience in Indo-China was grinding to an end
in the ruins of Dien Bien Phu.10
To black Americans, Brown signaled the start of a rising tide of hope.
It fueled the spirit of a civil rights movement that was to reach its zenith
in the early and mid-60's. To white Southerners, the decision on Black
Monday was received with very little rejoicing; most reacted with deep
resentment or bitter anger. Segregationist organizations flourished; moribund Ku Klux Klan Klavrons were resurrected and White Citizens Councils mushroomed. Opposition leaders were encouraged by strong statements of Southern congressmen vowing to fight to the finish for
segregation"1 and by silence from the White House, where President Ei9.

Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of

Education; 1975 LAW AND CoNeamp. Pon. 7 (hereinafter cited as Read).

10. Id. at 11.
11. R. SARRATT, THE ODtAL oP DESEGREGATION 41 (1966); J. PELTASON, Firry EiHT
LONELY MEN 41-42 (1961). On March 12, 1956, ninety-six Southern Congressmen issued the
"Southern Manifesto," denouncing the Brown decision as an abuse of judicial power. More
colorfully, Georgia Congressman Jack Flynt termed the Supreme Court's desegregation
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senhower refused to make any public comment on the Supreme Court's
decision but was rumored to oppose it privately. Parallel with the growth
of overt white resistence was the gradual, but perceptible change in Negro
attitudes. One December afternoon in 1955, in Alabama, the civil rights
movement began with the refusal of Mrs. Rosa Parks to take her accustomed seat in the back of a Montgomery bus. With the growth of the civil
rights movement, the federal courts in the Fifth Circuit states of Texas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida began to realize
that they faced massive civil rights litigation in which they would occupy
a legal no-man's land. For blacks, the crucial word in the Brown mandate
was "speed." For southern school boards, the crucial word was "deliberate." No help could be expected from Congress, controlled by southern
committee chairmen and paralyzed by the threat of filibuster, and the
President continued to remain silent.12 If Brown I and II were to be implemented, it had to come through the weakest of the three branches of
government: the federal courts.
The public events of the civil rights struggle are well known and the
names of the people and places are indelibly impressed on the conscience
of the nation: Little Rock; Montgomery; Albany, Georgia; St. Augustine,
Florida; Ole Miss and James Meredith; Autherine Lucy; Selma, Alabama;
Martin Luther King; Bull Conner; Chaney-Goodman--Schwerner; Big
Jim Clark; Lyndon Baines Johnson and Robert Kennedy. But the real
task of integrating a region was not accomplished or thwarted by any of
the people named or the events chronicled so vividly by a sensation-seeking media. The major integration contribution was made by largely invisible federal judges.
In 1954 when Brown I came down, there were but six judges on the
Fifth Circuit-in 1955 the Court was expanded to seven members. 8 On
that 1955 seven-judge Fifth Circuit, four men were destined to become
giants in the integration battles then looming on the horizon: Richard T.
Rives of Alabama, a Truman appointee, and John R. Brown of Texas,
Elbert Tuttle of Georgia, and John Minor Wisdom of Louisiana, all Eimandate "a hydraheaded, five-fanged, clovenhooved and fork-tailed combination of polecat,
dog, and rattlesnake." 47 NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1956, at 25-26.
12. Finally, President Eisenhower did act to enforce a federal court's order to desegregate Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. The sad history of the Little Rock crisis,
and Governor Orville Faubus' defiance, is set out in the Supreme Court's opinion in Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
13. In 1954, the six active judges were Chief Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., and Judges
Louie W. Strum, Robert L. Russell, Edwin R. Holmes, Wayne G. Borah, and Richard T.

Reeves. Very shortly, Judges Strum and Russell died and Judge Holmes opted for senior
status. President Eisenhower was eventually to appoint five judges to the Fifth Circuit:
Elbert P. Tuttle of Georgia; Ben F. Cameron of Mississippi; Warren L. Jones of Florida;

John Robert Brown of Texas; and John Minor Wisdom of Louisiana.

1981]

INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH

1155

senhower appointees.1' In the early years after Brown II, very few school
integration decisions reached the court of appeals level. Most were
blocked in litigation and delaying tactics at the federal district court
level. One of the critical legal problems faced in those early desegregation
cases was a very restrictive interpretation of the Brown mandate by the
Fourth Circuit involving the very South Carolina litigants who were parties to Brown I and II. Judge Parker, Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit,
had written the opinion in Briggs v. Elliott,1 5 one of the original cases
consolidated by argument in Brown I and II, when it was at the threejudge federal district court level, prior to Brown I. He then had stated
that the federal courts were powerless to attempt to interfere with state
educational policies that required segregation. After Judge Parker was reversed in the two Brown decisions, the case was remanded back to the
Fourth Circuit for action. In a per curiam decision, Brown II was interpreted very narrowly; and, the following key sentence (thereafter to be
known as the "Briggs v. Elliott dicta") was utilized: "The Constitution, in
other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination.""6 That dicta was followed in an early Fifth Circuit decision and
plagued the federal courts trying to implement Brown II for many
years.1 7 Therefore, the early years were epitomized by complex, snailpaced legal battles to achieve only the most token desegregation results.
Two examples will suffice: Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board's and

14. For biographical information on Judges Brown, Rives, Tuttle, and Wisdom, who became known as "The Four", and for information on all members of the Fifth Circuit in this
first period of integration see READ AND McGOUGH note 8 supra, at ch. 1, 23-60.
15. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (three-judge court).
16. Id. at 777. See discussion of the "Briggs v. Elliott dicta" in READ AND McGOUGH,
note 8 supra, at 73-76 and Read, note 9 supra, at 13.
17. Avery v. Wichita Falls Indp. Sch. Dist., 241 F.2d 230, 233-34 (5th Cir. 1957).
18. Following is a complete list of reported decisions in Bush v. Orleans Parish School
Bd., from its inception through 1962: 138 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. La.) (three-judge court), motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied, 351 U.S. 948 (1956); 138 F.
Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956), afl'd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921
(1957); 252 F.2d 253 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 356 U.S. 969 (1958); 163 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. La.
1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1959); 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La.) (three-judge court),
motion for stay denied, 364 U.S. 803 (1960), afl'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961); 188 F. Supp. 916
(E.D. La.) (three-judge court), motion for stay denied, 364 U.S. 500 (1960), aff'd, 365 U.S.
569 (1961); 190 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1960) (three-judge court), aff'd, 366 U.S. 212 (1961);
191 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La.) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom., Denny v. Bush 367 U.S. 908
(1961); 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La.) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom., Tugwell v. Bush 367
U.S. 907 (1961); a/f'd sub nom., Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961); 204 F.
Supp. 568 (E.D. La. 1962); 205 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. La. 1962), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
308 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1962).
Although the Supreme Court consistently affirmed decisons of its lower federal courts in
the Fifth Circuit, it never issed a full written opinion during the course of the litigation. For
a concise, well-written summary of the political history of New Orleans, see M. INGER,
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Meredith v. Fair.19
Desegregation litigation in New Orleans was actually filed in 1952 and
then lay dormant until 1958. However, from 1958 until 1962 there were
forty-one separate judicial opinions written in Bush v. Orleans Parish;
eleven separate Supreme Court appeals; and, before token desegregation
was achieved, Judge J. Skelly Wright, leading a three-judge federal court,
had declared forty-four Louisiana statutes unconstitutional and issued injunctions against a state court, all state executives, and the entire membership of the Louisiana legislature. The Louisiana legislature sat in five
extraordinary sessions, grinding out segregationist legislation, and just as
rapidly - occasionally on the same afternoon as this legislation was
passed - those acts were declared unconstitutional by Judge Wright, sitting with Circuit Judge Richard Rives and District Judge Herbert
Chrisenberry. Finally, in 1962, after a nightmare of litigation, four little
black girls were allowed into two New Orleans public schools. And, even
then, riots resulted in New Orleans, with the little girls being led to
school daily by U.S. Marshals through a phalanx of white mothers
20
screaming obscenities.
The last major effort to block desegregation by brute force occurred
when James Meredith matriculated at the University of Mississippi. Meredith v. Fair finally brought the Fifth Circuit, as an institution, face to
face with blind intrasigence. The Fifth Circuit itself was forced to consider contempt actions against the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of
the state, and, in the process, had to override four stays issued by Judge
Ben F. Cameron, one of its own members. Before the matriculation of
James Meredith was completed, a riot occurred at Ole Miss which required the intervention of the 82nd Airborne Division. When peace was
restored, two lay dead and six hundred were injured."
POLITICS AND REALITY IN AN AMEmCAN CrrY: THE NEW ORLEANS SCHOOL CRISIS OF 1960, at 9-

16 (1969).
19. 199 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Miss. 1961), afl'd, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962); 202 F. Supp.
224 (S.D. Miss.), rev'd and remanded, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.,), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828
(1962).
20. For a complete description of the almost unbelievable story of New Orleans segregation, see the chapter entitled "The Second Battle of New Orleans", READ AND McGoUGH,
note 8 supra, at ch. 3, 111-168.
21. See Id. ch. 5 at 207-252. For other accounts of the Ole Miss case, see R. BARRETr,
INTEGRATION AT OLE MISS (1965); W. LORD, THE PAST THAT WOULD NOT DIE (1965); J. MEREDITH, THREE YEARS IN MISSISSnPI (1966); Silver, Mississippi: The Closed Society, 30 J. So.
HIST. 3 (1964). See also V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE (1971); Leonard, Harris, & Wren,
How a Secret Deal Prevented a Massacre at Ole Miss, 26 Look, Dec, 31, 1962, at 18.
Before a federal force finally prevailed in the showdown at Oxford between Mississippi
Governor Ross Barnett and President John F. Kennedy, terrible damage had been done to

property, to human life, and to the reputation of the University. Two men were dead: Paul
Guihard, a French newspaperman representing Agence France-Presse,who was shot in the
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The burdens on the Fifth Circuit throughout the civil rights years were
intense. At the close of the fiscal year 1953-54, on the eve of the civil
rights explosion, the Fifth Circuit was only seven cases shy of being the
biggest circuit court in the nation. Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit has been
the busiest appellate court in the nation; it holds the dubious distinction
of being the most overworked and consistently strained of all the circuits.
From seven judges in 1955, it rapidly grew to a court of fifteen judges
during the era of massive integration. Its normal case load would have
taxed a court of similar size almost beyond its capability. But, superimposed on that burgeoning load of regular federal litigation, the Fifth Circuit too frequently had to supervise the most minute details of vigorously
fought desegregation battles.
III. THE LABORING OR: 1964-1968
An enormous whirlwind of activity occurred in the middle years of the
Bloodless Revolution, 1964 to 1968. After the trauma of James Meredith
and Ole Miss in 1962, when the Fifth Circuit had seen its judicial orders
contemptuously ignored by the entire apparatus of government of the
state of Mississippi, even the casual reader of civil rights cases can sense
that an enormous change occured in the spirits of those on the Court."2 A
new reservoir of strength and steel resolve seemed to well up out of the
majority of judges. By bitter experience they had learned that, if the
mandates of Brown I and Brown II were to be carried out, it would take
unrelenting judicial pressure on Southern state governments, school
boards, and, regrettably, on lower federal court judges in several cases.
It is impossible to single out the "key" desegregation cases during the
middle years of 1964 to 1968. In a sense all of the desegregation battles in
the Deep South during those years were key. For example, in Lee v. Maback, and Ray Gunter, an Oxford workman, who was shot in the forehead while watching
the riots. At least 160 marshals were injured, 38% of those sent to Ole Miss. W. Lord, supra
at 231. Sixteen of the Mississippi National Guardsmen first led into the riot scene were
injured. No one can be sure of the extent of injuries among rioters, but they were much less
extensive - a cold indication of where the balance of force lay. Federal forces took over 200
prisoners, only 24 of whom were Ole Miss students. No convictions resulted from the
rioting.
22. In the aftermath of the James Meredith case, the Fifth Circuit was charged by Judge
Ben F. Cameron, one of its own members, with "packing" the three-judge panels convened
to hear civil rights cases with judges favorable to the civil rights complainants. Despite denials of the Cameron charges, bad publicity from the Southern press caused Senator James 0.
Eastland, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to threaten an investigation of the
Fifth Circuit's pro-civil rights judges. It was that forestorm of controversy that caused the
Fifth Circuit judges, other than Judge Cameron who died shortly thereafter, to pull together
as a cohesive institution. See READ AN McGoUGH, note 8 supra, at ch. 6, 266-280.
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con County Board of Education,2 District Judge Frank Minis Johnson,
with steely determination, at one point ordered over 118 school districts
to desegregate the following fall, while Governor George Wallace postured
on the sidelines.2 4 In Florida, Federal District Judge Bryan Simpson, at
great personal risk to himself, enjoined by name the local police department, mayor's office, and members of white supremist groups in order to
prevent them from engaging in violence against civil rights demonstrators
in St. Augustine.2
Other federal district judges were not as forthright in their enforcement
of the constitutional rights of black children as were Judges Johnson and
Simpson. Federal district court Judge William Harold Cox of Mississippi,
used every conceivable roadblock to frustrate civil rights litigants who
came before him. In one letter, he characterized John Doar, the Justice
Department's civil rights chief under Robert Kennedy as "completely stupid".2 6 One of the most notorious federal judges in the South, and one
who gave no end of trouble to the Fifth Circuit, was Judge Frank M.
Scarlett in the Southern District of Georgia. Through a seemingly endless
series of delays and obstructions, Judge Scarlett effectively blocked any
real integration in Savannah and Augusta, Georgia until his death. He
attempted at one point to relitigate, on the merits, the holding in Brown
that separate educational facilities were inherently unequal. He allowed a
parade of witnesses to put in testimony as to the inferiority of the Negro
race, thus laying a factual predicate for finding that the Supreme Court
was wrong in its holding. After clogging the docket for months with this
frivolous testimony, Judge Scarlett's decision was reversed preemptorily
by telephone the following afternoon by Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle of the
Fifth Circuit who, in one of the sternest reversal opinions ever recorded,
noted that Judge Scarlett's conduct amounted to a clear abuse of judicial
discretion.2 7
23. 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
24. For a discussion of Lee v. Macon County and the monumental tug-of-war between
Judge Johnson and Governor Wallace, see RED AND McGOUGH, note 8 supra, at 398-407.
For his role in the desegregation of Alabama, Judge Frank Johnson was featured on the
cover of Time Magazine on May 12, 1967. Two weeks prior to the time he appeared on the
cover of Time, a cross was burned on his lawn and a bomb was exploded in the front yard of
his sixty-seven year-old mother.
25. For a discussion of Judge Simpson's courageous efforts in Florida, see READ AND McGOUGH, note 8 supra, at 418-424.
26. Id. at 409.
27. For a complete description of the attempts by Judge Scarlett to frustrate desegregation, see READ AND McGoUGH, supra at 377-388. The primary sources are: Roberts v. Stell,
379 U.S. 933 (1964); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1967); Calhoun v. Latimer, 321 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1963); Harris v. Gibson, 322 F.2d 780 (5th
Cir. 1963); Acree v. County Bd. of Educ., 294 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd, of Educ., 255 F. Supp. 88 (S.D. Ga. 1966). Also helpful are: 32
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And so the battle went all over the South from 1964 to 1968. Some
federal judges did their jobs and were backed to the hilt by the Fifth
Circuit. Some federal judges refused to do their jobs and were reprimanded or forced into activity by the Fifth Circuit. Many federal judges,
good and sincere men, were deeply troubled by the constant fear of violent reaction because of the massive change being brought by implementation of their decisions.2 s
At the Fifth Circuit level those middle years of 1964 to 1968 were years
of frenetic activity in attempting to evolve a desegregation doctrine that
would work. Left adrift without direction from the Supreme Court, the
Fifth Circuit, led by the piercing intellect of John Minor Wisdom, began
to evolve uniform standards which could be applied throughout the South
and which could rescue the courts from an avalanche of piecemeal desegregation litigation. That push toward uniform standards culminated in
four famous Fifth Circuit cases decided between 1955 and 1967: Singleton
ss
P9 and 1180 and Jefferson PI and II.
Those four cases became the most
important doctrinal school cases decided by the Fifth Circuit. They reinterpreted settled school desegregation law and, among other things, abrogated the Briggs v. Elliott distinction between integration and desegregation. Thereafter, a mandatory duty was placed on school officials in states
where, prior to Brown, segregation had been mandated by state law (de
jure segregation), to take affirmative steps to integrate the public schools.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit held that the newly adopted HEW standards contained the minimally acceptable integration requirements that
would be approved by the courts; and, those HEW standards were mandated circuit-wide.38 Lastly the court indicated that "the only school desegregation plan that meets constitutional standards is one that works."'"
The last paragraph of Jefferson I signaled the end of the search for uniform standards typified by the middle years of desegregation:
Now after twelve years of snail's pace progress toward school desegreU.S.L.W. 3256 (Jan. 14, 1964); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)(1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(1976); GA.
CODE ANN. § 32-910 (1969); and "School Desegregation in Ten Communities," A Report of
the United States Commission on Civil Rights (June, 1973). Of help were N.Y. Times, Aug.
29, 1963, § 1, at 14, col. 8, and Handler, Savannah Is Calm Over Integration, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 2, 1963, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
28. See, e.g., discussion on Judges Harlan, H. Grooms, Seybourn H. Lynn, and Daniel H.
Thomas, READ AND McGOUGH, note 8 supra, at 406-407.
29. Singleton v. Jackson Sep. School Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1975).
30. Singleton v. Jackson Sep. School Dist., 355 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1966).
31. United States v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
32. United States v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).
33. See Read, note 9 supra, at 20-28 for a more complete analysis of Singleton I and II
and Jefferson I and II.
34. 372 F.2d at 847.
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gation, courts are entering a new era. The question to be resolved in each
case is: How far have formerly de jure segregated schools progressed in
performing their affirmative constitutional duty to furnish equal educational opportunities to all public school children? The clock has ticked
the last tick for tokenism and delay in the name of "deliberate speed."35

IV.

MASSIVE INTEGRATION: 1968-1972

After the Fifth Circuit's landmark decisions in Jefferson I and II and
Singleton I and II, the Fifth Circuit had evolved the law of desegregation
at the beginning of 1968 into a command to individual school boards to
comply with uniform, rigorous HEW inspired guidelines intended to add

teeth to weak "freedom of choice plans" preferred by local boards of education. At that point the United States Supreme Court stepped back into
the desegregation struggle.
In 1968 in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 6 the
Supreme Court examined the operation of a "freedom of choice" plan
adopted in a Virginia case up from the Fourth Circuit. Picking earlier

Fifth Circuit language, the test mandated by the Supreme Court was a
simple one: Does the plan work? 7 Implicitly, the workability of a plan
was to be measured by the percentages of integration achieved in each
school. After Green v. New Kent County, "freedom of choice" was

through. The Court stated that school boards had an affirmative duty to
convert immediately to a unitary system in which segregation was to be

"eliminated root and branch."'

In 1969, the Supreme Court again spoke and the Fifth Circuit, a court
overburdened with civil rights cases for the whole of the 1960's, received
another mandate. In a short per curiam command the Supreme Court in
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education8 buried the Brown II
35. Id. at 896.
36. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
37. Id. at 439.
38. Id. at 437-38.
39. 396 U.S. 19 (1969). Implementation of Green infuriated segregationists across the
South. For the first time, real integration of the public schools-as opposed to token desegregation-appeared as a distinct probability. Encouraged by lukewarm statements on civil
rights by Richard Nixon during the Presidential election of 1968, southern politicians prepared a last-ditch fight against integration by addressing their protests directly to the highest levels of the new administration. It is reported that, to accommodate Senator Stennis of
Mississippi, then leading a floor fight on deployment of the ABM missle system, President
Nixon brought pressure on HEW Secretary Finch to delay the pending desegregation orders
in Mississippi. See L. PrrrA

& P. GALL, BasNG Us ToGETHM

(1971). In any event, Secre-

tary Finch wrote Chief Judge John R. Brown a letter requesting a delay in those counties,
stating that implementation of the court orders would produce "chaos, confusion and a catastrophic education setback" to the children involved. Id. at 255. Relying on the Finch letter,
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"all deliberate speed" standard of integration. Fourteen years after
Brown II, the Court stated that continued operation of racially segregated
schools under the standard of "all deliberate speed" is no longer constitutionally permissible. School districts were bluntly told to terminate immediately all vestiges of a dual school system based on race and to operate only unitary systems. To make the point crystal clear, the Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit in Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School
Board,'0 which, in February of 1970, had held, on the basis of Alexander
v. Holmes County Board of Education,that desegregation had to be complete in West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana, by September 1970.41 The
Court said that the Fifth Circuit, by allowing any delay at all, had misunderstood its command in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education-the Court would countenance NO further delay, not even until the
beginning of the next school term. Do it now meant precisely that, DO IT
2
NOW!'
After Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, and Carter v.
West Feliciana Parish, the Fifth Circuit, with its marching orders in
hand, literally ceased opinion writing and instead began issuing preemptory orders commanding immediate creation of integrated, unitary school
systems. 8 Innovative new methods of expediting school cases were
adopted under the enormously energetic leadership of John R. Brown,
Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit. A system of standing three-judge panels
was put into effect which permanently assigned a given school case to the
same judicial panel. The judges on that panel knew that until they effectively integrated a particular school district that case would remain on
their backs to plague them forever. Appeal times were shortened, oral arguments were eliminated in many cases, communication systems were set
up to circulate school opinions to the full circuit immediately, and, most
important, the circuit simply quit issuing lengthy legal opinions. John R.

the Fifth Circuit approved the requested delay. The NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund attorneys for the first time broke publicly with the Justice Department and appealed
the delay holding to the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ.. See
also READ AND McGOUGH, note 8 supra, at 479-494.
40. 396 U.S. 290, 291 (1970).
41. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970).
42. See discussion of Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, and its progeny
in Read, note 9 supra, at 30-38.
43. It was in this context that Chief Judge John R. Brown of the Fifth Circuit and members of his court came to a tacit agreement that no further en banc hearings would be held,
and opinion writing by three-judge panels would be avoided when possible. John Brown
preached over and over to his judges, "All that can be said about school cases had been said;
there is no point in writing further words." Interview with the Hon. John R. Brown, Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Houston, Texas, Aug.
3, 1972.
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Brown stated it succinctly: "After Alexander v. Holmes County Board of
Education, and Carter v. West Feliciana Parish there was simply no
more to write about anyway. The problem was to get the job done.""' In
one nine-month period from December 1969 to September 1970, Chief
Judge Brown reported to Chief Justice Burger that the Fifth Circuit's
new system of standing panels had handed down an astounding 166 opinion orders in school integration cases while still remaining current in their
normal case load. In comparison, the Fourth Circuit, which had the next
highest number of school cases, handled only eighteen in the same period.
While peaceful compliance was the rule, contrary to the impression given
by the media, continued entrenched resistence occurred in some areas. In
the combined Mississippi cases, the standing panel of Judges Bell,
Thornberry, and Morgan had to issue fifty-seven separate opinion orders
mandating in exquisite detail the methods of implementation to be employed. For example, some boards of education had to be told by the
court order not to place all black children in the back of the classroom,
not to create separate cafeteria lines and not to segregate the
4
playgrounds. 5
Thus came massive integration to the Deep South. In the four short
years from 1968 to 1972, the South was transformed into the nation's
most integrated region, and the desegregation battles shifted to the ghettos and barrios of the North and West.
V.

POST Swann: 1972 To DATE

Suddenly, in the fall of 1970, the Fifth Circuit suspended all further
issuance of integration orders and all judicial activity on school integration was frozen. What happened? From 1954, in Brown I, until the fall of
1970, the Supreme Court had never attempted to give any guidelines
whatsoever to the lower federal courts on the "techniques" to be employed in carrying out the Brown mandate. It had simply urged them to
move faster and to force more integration. In June of 1970, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education," a Fourth Circuit case. Until certiorari was granted in
Swann, the Fifth Circuit had assiduously avoided the use of such loaded
terms as "bussing" and "racial balancing." While transportation was used
44. Interview with the Hon. John R Brown, Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Houston, Texas, Aug. 3, 1972. For a description of some of
the expediting procedures, see Haworth, Screening and Summary Proceduresin the United
States Court of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 257; and READ AND McGOUGH, note 8 supra, at
464-470.
45. See Read, note 9 supra, at n. 108.
46. 399 U.S. 926 (1970).
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as a tool of desegregation, and while the success of a plan was measured
by the percentage of integration achieved, the terms of "bussing" and
"racial balancing" were avoided. Now, for the first time, the Supreme
Court indicated it would look at methods of integration and perhaps give
guidance to the lower courts not only on "What to Do" but also on "How
to Do It." When certiorari was issued in the Swann case, Chief Judge
Brown simply froze further judicial activity on integration in the Fifth
Circuit pending issuance of an opinion by the Supreme Court. The freeze
lasted nine months and finally, in late 1971, Swann417 came down.
Instead of bringing light to the lower courts, Swann brought deep confusion; in attempting to give guidance, the Supreme Court further muddled a murky situation. Swann is an opinion for all sides; with something
in it for everyone."6 Heated debates about its meaning were ignited and
the litigants streamed back into the lower federal courts seeking clarifications. Thus, the Fifth Circuit was forced again into the business of writing lengthly legal opinions about the theory of integration.
Throughout Swann, there was a tacit acceptance of the validity of the
unfortunate de facto-de jure distinction initially drawn by the Fifth Circuit in the Jefferson case. De jure segregation is segregation caused by

47. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
48. The opinion in Swann begins firmly enough by stating that there is to be no retreat
from the holding in Brown I; the objective remained to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. But the Court noted that, "Nothing in our national experience prior to
1955 prepared anyone for dealing with changes and adjustments of the magnitude and complexity required since then." Id. at 13. The Supreme Court then reaffirmed the duty of the
federal courts to fashion remedies to insure unitary school systems when school authorities
defaulted in their obligations. The Court said school authorities must remove all vestiges of
invidious racial discrimination in regard to faculty and staff assignments, transportation,
school facilities, and extracurricular activities. However, the key portions of the opinion
dealt with racial quotas and transportation. It was held that absolute racial quotas were not
required; every school need not reflect the racial composition of the system as a whole. However, in the very next paragraph the Court indicated that racial ratio information might be
an appropriate starting point for the District Courts to use in framing integration decrees.
There is to be a presumption against one-race schools but in certain cases, the Court said,
the existence of such schools may not denote segregation at all. Bussing as a tool of desegregation is within the Court's power, but distances should not be so great as to risk the health
of the children or impinge on the educational process. The Court particularly noted that
complaints about bussing are not well received from a school district that bussed for years
to maintain segregation. District courts do have the power to alter attendance zones and it
is permissible to use such techniques as "pairing" or "clustering" of schools. It is instructive
to note, on the question of bussing, that in Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33
(1971), a companion case to Swann decided the same day by the Supreme Court, and a
Fifth Circuit decision concerning Mobile, Alabama, was reversed and remanded with the
express command to see if a greater degree of integration could be obtained by more extensive use of bussing. For a more complete discussion of Swann and its effect, see Read, note 9
supra, at 33-38, and READ AN McGoUGH, note 8 supra, at 523-531.
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legal command; de facto segregation is, simplistically put, segregation
which grows up naturally without legal force. De jure segregation is typical of the South; de facto segregation is typical of the North and West. If
the Constitution only forbids de jure segregation, then the Southern black
child is entitled to receive the benefit of a desegregated, non-discriminatory education while the Northern black child, in a big city ghetto, who is
every bit as segregated and deprived, has no constitutional right to integrated education unless it can be established that his segregated school is
the result of intentional school board action. The artificiality of the de
jure-de facto distinction, and the disparity of treatment in the North and
the South because of that distinction, had enraged Southerners for some
time. In Swann the Supreme Court emphasized the de jure background of
Charlotte, North Carolina. Yet, the Supreme Court in Swann never explicitly accepted or rejected the de jure-de facto distinction. In fact, the
Supreme Court reserved decision in Swann on segregation caused by
factors other than a history of legal commands.
After Swann, the lower federal court system in the South was faced not
only with the continuing mandate to desegregate, but also with the task
of trying to decifer Swann and apply it to a multiplicity of local fact situations. How much bussing was required? What amount of racial mixing
was enough to enable a system to be called unitary? But, for the rest of
the nation, because of the de facto issue reserved in Swann, the most
perplexing problem was: Does the Brown mandate apply to us? Until
Swann, desegregation had been a Southern problem. The more subtle
forms of discrimination by housing pattern and economic condition that
existed in the North had been conveniently forgotten in the denunciation
of the South and its de jure background. But after Swann, what?
Again, the trail blazing Fifth Circuit attempted to point the way. It
decided two key cases, en banc, dealing with the public schools of Austin4 9 and Corpus Christi," Texas, and in the process it faced up to the
troublesome de facto-de jure distinction it had drawn in Jefferson in
1968. The Fifth Circuit had assumed that all segregation in the states
comprising the Fifth Circuit had a de jure background; that assumption
was shattered in the Austin and Corpus Christi cases. In both cases, the
Fifth Circuit found a history of segregation, but not just segregation of
blacks. Austin and Corpus Christi are tri-ethnic communities with a history of segregation of Mexican-American children as well as blacks. But
there was a difference in the kind of segregation. Mexican-Americans,
prior to Brown I, had also been segregated, not by law, but rather by
custom, school board action, and housing patterns. Mexican-American
49.
50.

United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972).
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indp. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972).
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segregation in schools was found in both cases to have been perpetuated
by school board action in building schools and drawing attendance lines.
The Fifth Circuit was finally forced to re-examine directly the de facto-de
jure distinction. The issue was simple. Could the court, in good conscience, grant black children the right to non-discriminatory education in
Austin and Corpus Christi and deny that same right to Mexican-American children who were every bit as segregated, based solely upon whether
the segregation employed has legal sanction prior to Brown I? The Fifth
Circuit simply could not bring itself to draw such a distinction under the
facts."1 It ordered desegregation for both blacks and Mexican-Americans
and, in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi, the Fifth Circuit expressly overturned
the de facto-de jure distinction it had drawn in Jefferson. The Fifth Circuit recognized that the implications of its decision were broad indeed5"
for the entire nation.
The Supreme Court, however, in cases arising out of Denver"8 and
Detroit," did not follow the Fifth Circuit's lead and the de facto-de jure
distinction remains. Therefore, it can fairly be said, that the Supreme
Court has consistently lagged behind the Fifth Circuit in the recent development of desegregation doctrine.
VI.

CONCLUSION

No court in this nation's history has had a more direct and continuing
commitment to any human rights issue than has the Fifth Circuit, and
those federal district judges who followed its lead. Too many citizens believe that the South was desegregated by the Supreme Court alone and
that mass demonstrations and violence were the typical road signs that
marked the route. Nothing could be further from the truth. The South
was integrated after a twenty-year legal war, featuring day by day battles
51. The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, New York, or
any other area of the nation which the opinion classifies under de facto segregation, would receive little comfort from the assertion that the racial make-up of
their school system does not violate their constitutional rights because they were
born into a de facto society, while the exact same racial make-up of the school
system of the 17 Southern and border states violates the constitutional rights of
their counterparts, or even their blood brothers, because they were born into a de
jure society. All children everywhere in the nation are protected by the Constitution, and treatment which violates their constitutional rights in one area of the
country, also violates such constitutional rights in another area.
Id. at 148, quoting Jefferson II, 380 F.2d 385, 397 (5th Cir. 1967) (Gewin, J., dissenting).
52. For a lengthy discussion of the Corpus Christi and Austin cases, contrasted with
later Supreme Court decisions involving the cities of Richmond, Denver and Detroit, see
READ AND McGOUGH note 8 supra, at 565-587.

53. Keys v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). See Read, note 9 supra, at 39-43.
54. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See Read, note 9 supra, at 43-47.
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in Southern federal courtrooms. A bloodless revolution has been fought
and won, with Fifth Circuit judges staffing the command post. On October 1, 1981, that greatest of all civil rights tribunals, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, will be split into two new circuits,
but its legacy will live on forever in the annals of the federal judiciary.

